







A Short History of Protagoras’ Philosophy
Abstract
It is a well­known fact that, with Nietzsche and Heidegger, a powerful re­evaluation of the 
history of philosophy took place, which brought about an inversion of the previously preva­
lent paradigm of progressive advancement. In Hegel and Husserl, to mention but two major 
figures of modern philosophy, the history of philosophy was conceived as the advancement 
from humble beginnings in ancient Greece, towards the ultimate culmination in absolute 
subjectivity in modern philosophy. Nietzsche and Heidegger, on the other hand, both in their 
way, more or less compellingly challenged this view by revealing the history of philosophy 
as regression and downfall rather than advancement. In their common view, the grand, yet 
undeveloped beginnings of philosophy, as recognised in the figures such as Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle, were strictly understood as the first downfall from the truly grand beginnings 
to be found in Pre­Socratic thinkers such as Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaximander, and 
even the notorious sophist Protagoras. The paper attempts to shed light on this cataclysmic 
shift of the philosophical­historical paradigm by paying particular attention to the history 
of interpretation of Protagoras’ philosophical impetus. The treatise ends with an open in­
terpretative horizon, thereby emphasizing the importance of a re­consideration of the two 































Protagoras’	anthropos metron or	homo mensura statement.	Of	course,	the	“no	
more	than	seven”	does	not	imply	unimaginativeness.	Quite	the	contrary,	this	
quantitative	weakness	 betrays,	 again	 and	 again,	 a	 peculiar	 and	 astounding	
strength	of	Heidegger’s	thinking,	capable	of	disturbing	the	balance	of	tradi-
tion,	of	 the	 taken	for	granted,	 in	as	few	words	as	possible;	with	Heidegger	

























Will to Power	in	its	necessary connection	with,	and	even	dependence	on,	the	





















heritage:	 Protagoras,	 Descartes	 and	 Nietzsche.	As	 said	 before,	 Protagoras	











































Greek’	 of	 the	 old	 stamp,	 made	 dialectic	 an	
everyday	 practice,	 conspired	 with	 tyrants,	









dles	 provisions	upon	which	 the	 soul	 is	 nourished”	–	Theaetetus dives	 into	
















ous	advocate	of	Socrates’	 readings,	which	can	be	summarized	 in	 the	claim	





















































Hegel’s jump and nietzsche’s leap
Much	later,	at	 the	peak	of	German	Idealism,	both	thinkers,	as	well	as	 their	
Protagoras,	are	re-appropriated,	with	the	very	same	crucial	aspects	of	percep-













tion,	 in	 its	 initial	 negativistic	 stance	 towards	 objectivity.	And	 the	 essential	
determination	of	his	subjectivity	is	the	restlessness	of	movement.	Protagoras	
manages	 to	come	into	possession	of	 the	self,	 the	embryo	of	 true	subjectiv-
ity,	which	 is	still	 individual,	simply	because	 in	assuming	 itself	 it	 is	wholly	
dependent	on	the	outer	reality,	which	deserves	but	abolition.	After	him	comes	
Socrates,	whose	 self	 is	 no	 longer	 negativity	 of	 individual	 restlessness,	 but	
2
Regardless	 of	 our	 strong	 claim	 made	 here,	

































paragraphs,	posthumously	published	in	The Will to Power,	reveals	an	elixir	of	
his	radical	alteration	of	the	view	on	the	sophists,	and	on	Protagoras	himself.	
What	happens	here	is	no	less	than	a	cataclysmic	and	unprecedented	subver-
































After	 this	 short	and	sharp	detour,	we	are	now	more	 than	 ready	 to	come	 to	



















lation	differs	from	traditional	solutions.	Of	course,	 in	 this	case,	 the	surface	
is	 the	 depth	 itself	 because,	 for	Heidegger,	 translation	 is	 always	 already	 an	
interpretation	(1982:	91):
“Protagoras’	saying	(according	to	its	transmission	by	Sextus	Empiricus)	runs	thus:	Panton	chre­

















the	 etymological	 truth	 of	 particular	words	 or	 concepts,	 the	 thing	 that	 first	
strikes	our	mind	is	the	inverted	commas	used	for	‘things’.	Immediately	after,	
the	sentence	inserted	within	brackets	hints	at	how	we	are	supposed	to	under-






understanding	 the	being	of	environmental	 things	 to	be	handled	with	as	 the	
readiness-to-hand.	Indeed,	chrema,	thing,	is	derived	from	the	verb	chraomai,	
which	means	to	use	or	make	use	of.	Now	the	meaning	of	the	second	part	of	





































admonition	 against	 such	 a	 reduction	 –	 and	 forgetfulness	 of	 being	 actually	
points	at	 this	overly	 reductive	approach	–	sees	 this	 thinker	of	being	enrich	































Two	years	before	European Nihilism,	in	The Age of the World Picture,	Hei-
degger	states	vehemently	(2002,	77–78):





















cannot be a deceiver,	that	within	the	stronghold	of	cogito’s	self-reflection,	He	










For	 the	 most	 compelling	 interpretation	 of	
Heidegger’s	 relation	 to	 Aristotle,	 far	 more	





Instead	of	 the	neutral	verb	 to be	he	uses	 the	
verb	to be present,	which	is	a	somewhat	awk-










Protagoras	offers	a	 lot,	and	perhaps	even	 too	much:	he	 is	not	 the	one	who	
relativizes	 the	 truth,	but,	 rather,	 remains	 thoughtfully	within	 the	primordial	
sphere	of	unconcealment,	mindfully	attuning	himself	to	the	primordial	meas-
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Kratka povijest Protagorine filozofije
Sažetak
Poznato je da je s Nietzscheom i Heideggerom došlo do snažne re­evaluacije povijesti filozo­
fije koja je dovela do inverzije do tada prevladavajuće paradigme progresivnog napretka. U 
Hegela i Husserla, da navedem samo dvije velike figure moderne filozofije, povijest filozofije 
razumljena je kao napredak od skromnih početaka u drevnoj Grčkoj do kulminacije u apsolutnoj 
subjektivnosti moderne filozofije. Nietzsche i Heidegger, međutim, svaki na svoj način, više su ili 
manje uvjerljivo izazvali takav pogled, otkrivajući povijest filozofije kao regresiju i pad prije ne­
goli napredak. U njihovu zajedničkom pogledu, veliki, ali slabo razvijen početak filozofije, kako 
se prepoznaje u Sokrata, Platona i Aristotela, striktno su razumijevani kao početak opadanja 
spram doista značajnog početka koji se mogao pronaći kod predsokratičkih filozofa poput He­
raklita, Parmenida i Anaksimandra, pa čak i notornog sofista Protagore. Ovaj rad želi osvijetliti 
to kataklizmičko pomicanje filozofsko­povijesne paradigme dajući posebnu pozornost povijesti 
interpretiranja Protagorina filozofskog impetusa. Rasprava završava kao otvoren interpreta­






Kurze Geschichte von Protagoras’ Philosophie
Zusammenfassung
Es ist bekannt, dass es mit Nietzsche und Heidegger zu einer starken Neubewertung der Ge­
schichte der Philosophie gekommen ist, die zu einer Inversion des bis dahin vorherrschenden 
Paradigmas des progressiven Fortschritts geführt hat. Bei Hegel und Husserl, um nur zwei 
große Figuren der modernen Philosophie zu nennen, wird die Geschichte der Philosophie als 
Fortschritt von den bescheidenen Anfängen im altertümlichen Griechenland bis zum Höhepunkt 
in der absoluten Subjektivität der modernen Philosophie erfasst. Indessen haben Nietzsche und 
Heidegger, jeder auf seine Art und Weise, mehr oder weniger überzeugend eine solche Sichtwei­
se hervorgerufen und die Geschichte der Philosophie eher als Regression und Niedergang als 
Fortschritt offenbart. In ihrer gemeinsamen Betrachtungsweise wird der große, aber schwach 
entwickelte Anfang der Philosophie, wie er bei Sokrates, Platon und Aristoteles erkannt wird, 
strikt als Beginn des Herabsinkens im Vergleich zu einem wahrhaftig bedeutsamen Anfang an­
gesehen, der sich bei vorsokratischen Philosophen wie Heraklit, Parmenides, Anaximander 
und sogar beim notorischen Sophisten Protagoras vorfinden lässt. Diese Arbeit setzt sich zum 
Ziel, diese kataklystische Verschiebung des philosophisch­geschichtlichen Paradigmas zu be­
leuchten, wobei der Geschichte der Interpretation von Protagoras’ philosophischem Impetus 
besondere Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet wird. Die Abhandlung endet als ein offener interpretativer 
Horizont und akzentuiert die Signifikanz einer erneuten Untersuchung zweier sich widerstrei­









Brève histoire de la philosophie de Protagoras
Résumé
Il est connu qu’avec Nietzsche et Heidegger la philosophie de l’histoire a subi une forte rééva­
luation qui a mené à une inversion des paradigmes, jusque­là dominants, de l’évolution pro­
gressive. Chez Hegel et Husserl, mentionnant seulement deux grandes figures de la philosophie 
moderne, l’histoire de la philosophie était comprise comme une évolution dont les débuts mo­
destes ont émergé en Grèce Ancienne et ont trouvé leur point culminant dans la subjectivité ab­
solue de la philosophie moderne. Nietzsche et Heidegger ont, pourtant, chacun à leur manière, 
plus ou moins encouragé un tel regard en révélant que l’histoire de la philosophie est davan­
tage régression et chute avant d’être évolution. Dans leur pensée commune, le commencement 
considérable, mais peu développé, de la philosophie telle qu’on la connaît chez Socrate, Platon 
et Aristote, est perçu comme le commencement d’un déclin en comparaison au commencement 
majeur que l’on pouvait trouver chez les philosophes présocratiques tels que Héraclite, Par­
ménide et Anaximandre, voire chez le fameux sophiste Protagoras. Ce travail souhaite mettre 
en lumière ce déplacement cataclysmique du paradigme philosophico­historique en attirant 
spécialement l’attention sur l’histoire de l’interprétation de l’impetus philosophique de Prota­
goras. La discussion se termine en proposant un horizon ouvert d’interprétation et en mettant 
l’accent sur l’importance d’une nouvelle recherche de deux paradigmes opposées dans l’his­
toire de la philosophie.
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